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Freedom of Speech and the Flag 
Anti-Desecration Amendment: 
Antinomies of Constitutional Choice 
William W. Van Alstyne 
Introduction 
On June 21, 1989, in Texas v. Johnsoll, the Supreme Court held that the Hrst Amend-
ment does not permit imprisonment for burning a flag in the course of an open political 
demonstration. I The Court's decision was widely featured on all major television networks 
the same day it came down, replaying film footage of the original incident as it had 
occurred in front of the Dallas City lIall. The Supreme Court decision came within three 
weeks of the shooting of students for demonstrating in Tiananmen Squan; in Beijing, 
events also replayed on television sets here at home. It was a summer unusually full of 
tumultuous events, even as one-party Communist regimes continued to come apart in 
eastern Europe and totalitarianism elsewhere continued to crack and break up. 
In response to the Court's decision in Texas 1'. Johnson, however, President Bush did 
not speak to the contrast of these events. Rather, speaking from a tlag-rimmed rostrum 
constructed for the occasion in front of the famous Iwo Jima flag memorial in Washington, 
the President called on Congress to protect the flag. lie did not contrast the freedom of 
political demonstration the Court had affirmed with the shootings and jail ings even then 
still ongoing in the People's Republic. Instead, he proposed the following amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States for prompt passage hy two-thirds of both Houses in 
Congress and for prompt ratification by the states: "The Congress and the States Shall 
Have Power to Prohibit the Physical Desecration of The Flag of the United States." 
The amendment was at once introduced in Congress where, however, it became tempo-
rarily sidetracked when Democratic majorities in both houses rushed to propose a new 
"Flag Protection Act," rather than the proposed amendment. At the time, it was clear they 
were not eager to approve an amendment, but by offering a new act-to do by redrafted 
statute what the President proposed to do by amendment-they hoped to avoid any political 
blame for being less patriotic than president Bush and the Republicans. 1 In tum, the 
President allowed the new act to become law without his signature, even while indicating 
that he believed it to be an insufficient substitute for the proposed amendment he continued 
to support as the appropriate response. 
The new act of Congress was swiftly tested by political demonstrators in Washington, 
D.C., and in Seattle , Washington. The two Federal district courts quickly vindicated the 
This essay is adaptcd from Notes suhmincd in opposition to thc proposcd 27th Amcndmcnt-the 
anti-flag desccration amendmcnt-when it was undcr consideratioIl in the House and Senate in 1989 
and 1990. 
96 
The Flag Anti-Desecration Amendment 97 
President's view. Each held that the cosmetic difference between the redrafted Federal 
statute and the original Texas statute stmck down in Texas Ii. johmon was of insufficient 
constitutional significance to make a difference under the First Amendment ] Each , there-
fore, on facts similar to those in Texas Ii. johnson, held the new Federal act unconstitutional 
as applied. On June II, 1990, on further and final review of these two new cases under 
the revised Federal statute, the Supreme Court agreed: 
Thc proposed 27th Amendment was at once re-introduced in Congress. After a flurry 
of debate in the Housc, it was approved by a clear majority but not by the extraordinary 
two thirds required by AI1icle V of the Constitution. As it failed to carry the House. the 
dehate in the Senate collapsed. It carried the President 's strong support to the end, however , 
and at least one national poll indicated that a substantial number of Americans clearly felt 
it to be a good measure for the country to enact. 
What did the proposed 27th Amendment to the Constitution mean') How would it have 
worked'} What kind of Hag uses would it have covered? What kind of legislation would 
it have insulated from review under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? What impact 
on our understanding of free speech might it have had'} And what would it have meant, 
if anything, in other countries where freedom of political dissent remains under attack? 
These are some of the questions one should want to think about before adding a provision 
to the Constitution of the kind the President proposed. It is entirely proper to take their 
measure even now, moreover, though the momentum for the amendment has passed away. 
For it is in reHecting on these things that we may better understand the meaning of freedom 
of speech under our First Amendment today. A review of the amendment is also worthwhi Ie 
because it will help one comc to terms with the original decision in Texas v. Johnson. It 
may help one sort out what made Texas v. Johnson a welcome and tmly important case. 
Thcre were, hroadly speaking, two kinds of issues raised by the proposed amendment. 
First, there was the question of the amendment 's scope in terms of the kind of legislation 
it would authorize. Just what would it have empowered Congress and the states to do? 
Second, there was also the question of the extent to which the amendment would affect 
the First Amendment as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court. How much of that 
amendment, if any, would the proposed amendment have set aside? 
After exposing this hitherto unexplored feature of the amendment in Part I, I shall 
suggest in Part II of this brief review why the amendment would have been a source of 
uncertainty regarding thc kinds of legislation it would and would not sustain. and what a 
profound mistake its adoption as part of our constitution would have been. In proceeding 
in this fashion, [ hope we may also see how events associated with this amendment and 
with Texas II. johnsoll also bear on events in other places such as those in Tiananmen 
Square. 
Did the Proposed 27th Amendment Purport to 
Alter or Affect Any Interpretation of the 
First Amendment? 
It is a seemingly odd thing that , although the amendment was introduced to overcome 
a decision of the Supreme Court based squarely on the First Amendment, the proposed 
amendment left the First Amendment intact and said nothing to suggest that the First 
Amendment was to be deemed inapplicable to any legislation adopted pursuant to its own 
provisions. In this singular aspect, moreover, the proposed amendment was wholly unlike 
past amendments that had been proposed and ratified to overcome other controversial 
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decisions by the Supreme Court. ~ Indeed, nothing on the face of the proposed amendment 
actually purported to mandate a different outcome in a case like Texas v. Johnson, as one 
may see from reviewing the actual case itself. 
In Texas v. Johnson,6 the Texas State Court of Appeals did not reverse Gregory 
Johnson's conviction on the basis that the State of Texas lacked some general power to 
forbid the desecration of venerated objects-the crime for which Gregory Johnson was 
convicted. Rather, it reversed his conviction solely on the basis of the First Amendment 
where the facts of the case placed Johnson's particular conduct within the protection of 
the First Amendment as part of an open, public political demonstration and where his acts 
were protected as a recognized form of free speech. Concretely, this is what the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals held: ' "We hold that section 42.09(a)(3) [the state flag antidese-
cration act] may not be used to punish acts of flag desecration when such conduct falls 
within the protection of the First Amendment. We express no view as to whether the State 
may prosecute acts of flag desecration which do not constitute speech under the First 
Amendment.,,8 So the state court itself distinguished acts of demonstrative Hag use in a 
political setting from unprotected acts of vandalism, theft, or defilement (e.g., throwing 
paint on a flag being carried by another), in drawing its own clear First Amendment lines. 
And the Supreme Court affirmed just that decision, as it likewise decided the two later 
cases, under the redrafted congressional statute, on the same First Amendment grounds. 
In order to forestall a decision like that reached solely on First Amendment grounds by 
both the state court and the Supreme Court in Texas v. Johnson, moreover, one might 
suppose that an amendment seeking that effect would need to read something much more 
like this: "The First Amendment shall not be deemed applicable to Federal or state 
legislation prohibiting the physical desecration of any American flag." But the proposed 
amendment did not say anything like this. Nor did it propose anything like the following 
terms: "Neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendment shall be construed to forbid the 
conviction of any person who physically desecrates any flag of the United States." Far 
from saying anything that suggests the First Amendment should be deemed inapplicable 
to any state or national law providing penalties for what the government may regard as 
the physical desecration of some facsimile of the flag (whether or not the government's 
property and whether or not used in protest of or dissent from some policy of the United 
States), however, the amendment simply tracked the form of other clauses vesting certain 
ordinary affirmative powers in Congress. It tracked the form of such routine constitutional 
provisions, that is, as these: 
The Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
states. and with the Indian tribes9 
The Congress shall have Power to establish Post Offices and post Roads 10 
Indeed, the comparison with other clauses of this sort is so striking that the proposed 
amendment should be examined again, virtually side by side: "The Congress and the States 
Shall have Power to Prohibit the Physical Desecration of The Flag of The United States." 
But we know, of course , that the First Amendment fully applies to any act adopted by 
Congress pursuant to any of its previously enumerated express powers, whether it is an 
act regulating commerce among the several states or an act establishing post offices and 
post roads. II And we know, too, that the proposed amendment stated no exception in 
respect to any law adopted pursuant to the particular power ("to prohibit the physical 
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desecration of the flag") to which it speaks. If, then, though an action of the sort that 
Johnson participated in were subsequently to be prosecuted pursuant to some state or 
national law based on this amendment,11 if the act were also an act within the First 
Amendment in light of the circumstances involved in the particular case (like those 
involved in Johmon itself l ), when called upon to show why no First Amendment claim 
should be heard , what can one point to in the proposed amendment to make good any 
such claim? 
Thc origin of the proposed amendment doubtless did lie in the felt dissatisfaction of 
those who sponsored it with the manner in which the Supreme Court had construed and 
applied the First Amendment. But to have their way in this matter, if they did mean to 
oust the First Amendment from further consideration in this matter, it was incumbent upon 
them to say so. An amendment that would do so is quite different from the amendment 
that was introduced and endorsed by President Bush. It is different, moreover, because 
on its face it would declare that this nation does not want or does not deem the First 
Amendment to be appropriate to one particular kind of symbolic expression despite its 
own Supreme Court's view that the First Amendment docs apply to such conduct and that 
it applies unexceptionably. It is also different in the important sense that the very process 
of confronting the issue in those terms would have made the debate in Congress and 
elsewhere very different. When put that way, I think it much less likely that any amend-
ment, so proposed and so understood , would have rallied much support. The events from 
Tiananmen Square would have been drawn on powerfully to show the blow any such 
amendment would deliver against our own Constitution. It would never have gotten off 
the ground. 
Suffice it to say, however, that this amendment did not do so. Indeed , it addressed none 
of these matters at all. And why not? Because, no doubt, it would have been seen even 
more clearly for what it was and would itself doubtless have led to the amendment's 
defeat. We know that any such amendment would, in all likelihood , not pass . Such an 
amendment would, thus framed, in all likelihood not, in fact, be approved by many who 
otherwise may not approve every Supreme Court decision but who nonetheless would not 
want so to amend the Constitution of the United States. 
Behind Texas v. Johnson, there lay a significant history. Over the years, the Supreme 
Court had reviewed more than a half-dozen criminal convictions involving flag use. and 
the results were not all of a piece. On the one hand, the Court has found little difficulty 
sustaining regulations restricting the commercialization of flags or flag facsimi les as an 
incident of hawking goods or promoting commercials ales. I" On the other hand. like many 
ordinary citizens in this country, the Court had experienced genuine problems in sorting 
out other events involving flag uses in keeping faith with the First Amendment, in 
noncommercial settings. And, overall, it had drawn significant, useful First Amendment 
lines strongly protecting rights of political dissent. For example, an individual who. 
believing a national policy to be wrong and unworthy of the United States, may signal his 
or her message even in the manner of an international distress signal, i.e. , by flying the 
flag on his car antenna or in his own front window, upside down. Another may emboss 
it with taped superimposition of a peace sign. 15 Generally, both kinds of acts would be 
regarded as forms of political expression clearly protected by the First Amendment to our 
Bill of Rights, not just under the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson , but also because 
they were already so regarded by the Court prior to that decision. 
A case may instead involve a black citizen and war veteran, grief-stricken by the news 
account he receives by radio of the purported shooting in the South of a civil rights figure . 
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Weeping, he takes his own flag to the street beside his apartment. Cradling it, he bums 
it in despair. 10 Is this a crime? Shall it be constituted a crime? Does one see no First 
Amendment issue at stake? A very large number of Americans certainly might, even as 
the Supreme Court did. 
So the proposed amendment rather willfully said nothing of these matters. It spoke no 
word as to how the Supreme court should construe and apply the First Amendment in 
cases involving acts of flag "desecration :" where- as is typically the case- the flag is not 
government property but may be a personal facsimile made of paper or other material and 
is used in some demonstrative way to express dissent from some policy or position of the 
government of the United States. Indeed, on its face, the proposed amendment affected 
no previous application of the First Amendment in any way at all. Insofar as it meant 
nonetheless to do so, it hid that purpose (to such extent that it harbored that purpose) 
underneath calculated language. It hoped, thereby, to slide easily into place. 
If the proposed amendment did mean to exempt from First Amendment review all such 
legislation as would fit within the power vested in Congress and the states, then, of course, 
one would want to have a very clear picturc of that power because, by hypothesis, the 
First Amendment would be cut off from any act otherwise bearing on things one may do 
in respect to the flag . 17 So, just what would the amendment, thus understood, have done'? 
The Unravelling of an Ill-Considered Amendment 
The choice of language restricting the amendment to allow punishment only of acts of 
"physical" desecration was deliberate. At one stage, before it became somewhat unravelled 
(as we shall see), it was meant to represent some serious concession to First Amendment 
concerns- to keep the amendment itself within reasonable bounds. It initially reflected an 
intention to reach only fonns of actual physical disfigurement of a flag. whether by 
mutilation, burning, tearing , spitting on a flag, or some other physical hesmirching of it 
in some other way . It expressly did not mean to reach mere words of contempt or verbal 
expressions of derision about the flag or about anything which , in the opinion of the 
offending speaker, the flag allegedly represents. So much as this seemed 4uite clear. In 
short, as long as the flag (no matter whose flag) is not itself physically desecrated. i.e., 
as long as it is intact, unaltered , unmutilated, unburnt, physically unsullied. the amendment 
is still in its sheath. Certainly an ordinary citizen's posting of a fla g. on a standard angled 
from his own porch in the usual way , was not meant to be affected by any legislation 
possibly based on this amendment. 
But likewise , then, assuredly the amendment would not reach the flying of any iflfacl 
flag, even giant size, say. from a flagpole outside a Hardee's Fast Food Restaurant'? 
Possibly, but somehow the example becomes contentious insofar as some might regard 
this to be an inappropriate (because commercial) use, even one in their view that is 
physically desecrative because it seeks to identify the commercial product of the entrepre-
neur with the national flag. Still, in keeping with the emphasis solely on "physical" 
desecration, perhaps there is no reaching such a use by leg islation connected with this 
amendment. The flag's use may be objectionable to some, even conceivably mildly 
"desecrative" in some sense, but "physically" desecrative , perhaps not. 
But if that much is so, then similarly the amendment ought to be equally inapplicable 
as addressed to an American Nazi Party march, otherwise protected by the First Amend-
ment, a parade involving the carrying of a sound, unaltered, intact American flag at the 
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head of the march. It- i .e., this use - likewise involves no mutilation, no alteration. no 
hurning . spilling on. rending. de. of the standard itself. There is no more " physical" 
desecration of the Ilag here. any more than in the presupposed Hardee's Restaurant case. 
What, then. however. of anothcr w'ho is not a Nazi and who does not engage the use 
01 the flag as part of a pol itical assembly or parade, but who merely displays the tlag 
upside dovin. e.g . . as a member of a group protesting somc U.S. military engagement 
abroad they hclieve to be an undeclared war and an immoral usc of force ') [s there any 
physical desecration in this act'! Evidently. some think there may he, and, indeed, those 
purpol1ing to speak for the administration in support of thc amendment testificd that, in 
their view. the anwndment would su~tain legi~lation of exactly this prohibitory kind. '" But 
if one is inclined to stretch the word "physically" to include the mere manner of displaying 
an intact flag k.g . . displaying it upside down- as a physically desecrating manner of 
display) on the reasoning that ~uch a manncr of display is inappropriate and disrespectful 
01 appropriatc Hag display. one needs to reconsider all the cases previously posed. If the 
amendment can he stretched in this way, many may equally well conclude that for an 
American Nazi Party to parade with the flag at all is equally to "desecrate" the flag hecause 
of the infamous auspices of tho~e who would so parade "'lith it puhlicly. May Congress 
and state legislatures therefore also contine use of the tlag to certain political parties in the 
United States') If it were to do so. e.g., to disallow' the tlag to be displayed under political 
auspices other than by the Republican , Democratic. and other "mainstream" parties, would 
such a law be (a) valid by force of this proposed amendment, or would it instead be (b) 
invalid either under the b'irst Amendment or invalid (e) under the Fifth Amendment'S 
implied equal protection clause (e.g., Socialists. Environmentalists. Communists. Liber-
tarians)? 
Next. then. to the different case of another who carefully affixcs removahle lapc in the 
shape of a peace symbol and displays the tlag in his home front window, albeit quile 
properly and respectfully. i.e .. right side up'!'" Is this an act of "desecration" at all') To he 
sure. the fiag thus displayed has a superimposed tigure temporarily affixed; yet, the flag 
itself is not mutilated. burned, rent , dirtied. or soiled. In what respect, then, may it fairly 
be said that this is an act of "physical desecration" of the flag·) en 
There is . moreover. a rdated problem of interpretation raised by the proposed amend-
ment. The related problem is that of proposing and understanding some baseline detinition 
of the phrase "the/fag of the United Slates." Assuming one gets control of what it is to 
commit an act of "physical desecration." still. consistent with the proposed terms of the 
amendment. it is not subject to prohibition unless it is physical desecration of "the flag of 
the United States;" i.e . , it must be such a tlag for the amendment to apply at all. 
Initially. to be sure. the term seems perfectly clear. One starts with a standard flag or 
the United States. then one does something with it or to it that "physically desecrates" 
thatffaf;' And that understanding dovetails with the background from which this proposed 
amendment arose. i.e., Texlls v. lolli/sun, involving. as it did, the burning of and spitting 
on a flag . 
But suppose one does not start with a tlag which one "physically desecrates." Rather, 
suppose one starts with a mere idea, e. g .. a stars-and-stripes motif. The simplest example. 
perhaps. viould be proposed by a swim suit designer who designs a bikini using the stars-
and-stripes motif. Raqud Welch has been previously photographed in just this way. [n 
this instance. unlike Texas \'. lullllsun, there never was "a flag" that is altered. disfigured. 
torn . or modified. There was no tlag "physically desecrated" in the construction of this 
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suit. Neither did Ms. Welch physically desecrate any flag of the United States. Accord-
ingly, may we suppose that laws adopted pursuant to the amendment would not apply to 
a case of this sort? 
But if that is so in Ms. Welch 's case, what. then. of any other original constructions 
that never were a flag, whether a flag bought commercially or a flag made at home? Will 
a law adopted pursuant to this amendment apply--{)r not apply- to a sculptor who, 
wishing to make a political point, constructs displays an original work that never was a 
flag of the United Slates, i.e., neither the sculptor's own "flag" or anyone else's? What 
he or she makes is nonetheless very "flaglike" and highly offensive in a number of respects. 
It has a projecting part in the shape of a swollen phallus, closely spiraled with alternate 
red and white stripes. The grotesque red-and-white striped barrel of this cannon sculpture 
rests on a gun carriage shaped to suggest a misshapen. oversized scrotum, painted blue, 
superimposed with white stars. The message of this work is loud. clear, and confronta-
tional. Many may think it a physical desecration of the flag of the United States. But what 
"flag" was physically desecrated, since the artist never used a flag as such at all?!! How 
does one want to conclude in this case? That the artist can be sent to prison because his 
or he work violates a law duly enacted by Congress or some state. deemed authorized by 
the proposed amendment, or that the display of the work is, instead , fully protected by 
the First Amendment') 
And if we but continue this new turn of emphasis , i.e. , from the express requirement 
of some kind of physical sullying or physical changing (mutilation. burning, etc.) of a 
flag, to the emphasis on the additional idea of "desecration," how much further along do 
we get? Consider again the case of the person who, grief-stricken with the news of the 
reported assassination of a civil rights figure. weeps over his flag and cradles it in his 
arms, even while burning it on the sidewalk beside the tenement where he lives . What 
docs one say?"" Is this an act of "flag desecration" or is it a cry of despair? Docs the regret. 
the anguish, the whole posture of the person provide an insight and also a new First 
Amendment perspective we had not properly stopped to consider'? Yet. here we have put 
an instance of an actual flag burning, no less! Yet again. the question of First Amendment 
freedom presses heavily in upon us from the outside as we come to terms with this 
case. Would legislation applied by some state to this case be deemed exempt from First 
Amendment review if the proposed amendment is adopted? But assuming that it might 
be. just why would we desire that this be so'? 
In the end. of course, it is ultimately this kind of 4uestion that must be asked more 
generally by Congress, whether in the case last put or in any other case. It is. in fact , just 
this very question we have actually been asking all along. The point has never been the 
trivial point of putting merely vexing hypothetical questions. That 4uestion is. rather. why 
would Americans who watched the grim events two summers ago in Tiananmen Square 
not want their First Amendment to apply? Who, really, now wants to rise up and condemn 
what the Court did in these cases? And who among the sponsors of the proposed amendment 
can say whether this is what the amendment would or would not do? 
Concluding Thoughts on the Proposed Amendment: 
What Do We Value in the United States? 
These last several observations bring us full circle. The object of the proposed 27th 
Amendment was avowedly to protect the flag as a symbol of national unity . Virtually all 
agree that this was its main point. But it must he obvious that neither this nor any other 
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amendment can advance that aspiration effectively, because unity is in the heart and in 
the mind of what people feel and clearly not in the model of a totalitarian law consecrating 
state symbols including our own. The fact is that in all the debates on the redrafted Federal 
statute and the proposed constitutional amendment, no one ever once gave a good reason 
why we should, as a people, desire to strip citizens of such right as they may otherwise 
have under the First Amendment, to try to reverse the Supreme Court in Texas v. lohnson. 
When we consider the protection Gregory Johnson received in the Supreme Court of the 
United States during the same summer we watched the "protection" of the students in 
Tiananmen Square in China, which example did we respond to? And how now do we 
want ourselves to be known ') 
In his first inaugural address as President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson-who 
had much to do with our First Amendment-spoke feelingly on the subject of patriotism, 
the subject that animates this proposed amendment. Jefferson spoke soberly on that 
occasion of those then seeking to dissolve the Union itself. "Let them stand undisturbed 
as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may he tolerated when reason is 
left free to comhat it," Jefferson declared. In most of the world, there arc no real monuments 
of safety for dissent. Here at home, in Texas v. lohman, however, our own Supreme 
Court reminded us that there is. The real monument of safety for dissent in the United 
States ahides in the First Amendment in our Bill of Rights. We should take care to leave 
that amendment alone. In an odd way, moreover, we are unified in the freedom the First 
Amendment provides us. It is a freedom too little of this world is able to share. 
Noles 
I. Texas \'. johnson, 491 U.S. _ __ ,109 S.Ct. 2533 (1989). The breakdown of votes on the 
Suprclllc Court confounded Illany COUll watchers when thc decision eame down. Justices Kennedy 
and Scalia, Reagan appointees who had been regarded disparagingly by a number of observers at 
the time of their ascension to the Court. were crucial in providing the majority of five votes (including 
Brennan, Mar~hall. and Blackmun). Justice Stevens. the more warmly regarded appointee by 
President Ford, on the other hand. joined the dissent (including White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor). 
2. The President's proposal followed not long after his successful presidential campaign against 
Michael Dukakis in 1981-1. In the course of that campaign. Mr. Bush repeatedly faulted Mr. Dukakis 
for his failure, as Governor of Massachusetts, to have signed a mandatory pledge of allegiance act 
applicable to all public school teachers-an act the Massachusetts Supreme Court had formally 
advised Dukakis could not constitutionally be enforced. ISee the opinion of the Justices, 372 Mass. 
874 ( 1977).1 Without doubt. in promptly proposing the amendment following the Court's decision 
in Tna.I' \'. johnson. Mr. Bush had again taken the initiative on a highly charged issue where the 
Democrats appeared most vulnerable. i.e .. the issue of patriotism and love of country. 
3. Uniled SWle.I' 1'. Eichmall. S8 U.S.L.Wk. 2538 (D.C. Dis. Ct. March 5, 1990); United States 
\' . HaRRal".. S8 U.S.L.Wk. 2498 (Dis. W. Wash. 1990). 
4. Ulliled Stale.l· \'. t'ichmar! et al., No. S90- 1438. June II. 1990. 110 S.Ct. 2404 (affirming 
lower court, live to four). (The divi~ion within the Supreme Court was unchanged from the division 
in Texas \'. johnson itself.) The original act of Congress. 18 U.s.c. Section 700 (1968). provided 
that the offense was committed by "castling] contempt upon any tlag of the United States by publicly 
mutilating. defacing, defiling. burning. or trampling upon it." The new act. 11-1 U .S.C. Section 700 
(Supp. 1990) , made it nominally a matter of indifference whether one was or was not "casting 
contempt" on the tlag. and whether one was or was not acting in public, i.e .. it eliminated such 
language so that proof of purpose would no longer be of statutory consequence. Rather, the 
Federal crime was complete insofar as one "knowingly mutilates. defaces, physieally defiles, burns, 
maintains on the tloor or ground. or tramples upon any tlag of the United States." In theory. 
therefore. the offense would be punishable wherever it occurred and without reference to the 
circumstances (if one " mutilated" a tlag while alone in one's bedroom, or maintained a flag on the 
tloor of one's locked attic. the statute would apply) . 
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5. Compare the wording of the Eleventh Amendment which is in this form as an amendment. 
The Eleventh Amendment was proposed and ratified in reaction to a particular Supreme Court 
decision (Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dall . 419 (1793). The Eleventh Amendment is reflexive- i.e. , it 
expressly refers to language found in the Constitution in Article III of the Constitution (namely. "the 
judicial power of the United States") and provides expressly how that language shall not be 
eonstrued-that it "shall not be construed to extend to" a case brought against a state by a citizen 
of another state. In contrast. the proposed 27th Amendment is unlike the Eleventh Amendment; i.e . . 
it does not purport to say how the First or Fourteenth Amendments shall be construed or interpreted 
to apply to such acts of Congress as may forbid acts of physical desecration of the flag of the United 
States. 
The proposed amendment is also unlike the Sixteenth Amendment. an amendment likewise 
proposed in reaction to a particular decision by the Supreme Court [Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & 
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 ( 1895)1. The Sixteenth Amendment expressly authorizes income taxes to 
be levied by Congress "without apportionment. " It thus makes clear that to whatever extent such 
taxes might previously have been valid only if apportioned by population according to the Supreme 
Court's interpretation and application of the Constitution's express apportionment requirement found 
in Article I, Section 9. Clause 4. income taxes would not hereafter be subject to judicial review on 
grounds of failing to conform to the apportionment clause. 
6. The decision in Texas v. Johnson is at 109 S.C!. 2533 (1989) . The State Court of Appeals 
decision, affirmed in the Supreme Court. is Johnson v. Slate, 755 S. W .2d 92 (Tex . Cr. App . 1988). 
7. Johnson v. Slate. 755 S.W.2d 92 , 97 (Tex. Cr. App. 1988) . (Emphasis added.) 
8. E.g., where the flag were government owned and the statute forbade defacing it either as 
government property or (in a suitable instance) as the property of another person. Johnson's 
demonstrative conduct would not be protected by the First Amendment from prosecution for thc 
destruction of that property. (Interestingly in the actual case . the flag was a flag Johnson seized from 
government premises-but the prosecution wasn ' t broljght for his act of arson or his act of theft but 
for his act of expressing contempt as such.) 
9. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3. 
10. Id. Clause 7. 
II. E.g .. an act of Congress may be fully constitutional as an affirmative exercise of Congress ' s 
express "power to regulate commerce among the several states," but, if the "commerce" is commerce 
in books (for instance) and if the regulation is one that seeks to restrict thcir free circulation, it may 
be invalid on pure First Amendment grounds . In tum. the power to establish post offices and post 
roads is separate from the power vested in Congress to regulate commerce among the several states; 
but every act providing for the treatment of the mail as such is also subject to full First Amendment 
review. [Indecd , the first decision of the Supreme Court to invalidate an express act of Congress on 
First Amendment grounds involved an act regulating thc usc of the mails , LamOni 1' . Postmaster 
General , 381 U.S. 301 (1965) .) The express power granted to Congress to provide for post offices 
and post roads contains no provision excluding any exercise of that power from First Amendment 
review, of course; and again, neither does the proposed 27th Amendment contain any such exempting 
provision or clause. 
12. E.g., an act making it a state or Federal offense for any person "physically to desecrate the 
flag of the United States . ... " 
13. E.g., an arrest and prosecution of one who tears in half his own flag to demonstrate. in a 
public way across the street from the White House, his view that the government is acting wrongly 
in assisting the suppression of land reform movements in EI Salvador or somewhere else . See also 
the numerous actual kinds of cases presented infra, in this review . 
14. See, e.g., Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907). 
15. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
16. Cj. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969). For other significant Supreme Court cases on 
flag use and First Amendment protected dissent. see, e.g., Smith v. Gogllen. 415 U.S. 566 (1974); 
Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531. affg, 26 N.Y.2d 114 (1970), on habeas corpus in U.S. ex reI. 
Radich 1'. Criminal Court, 459 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1972), cerl. dell. 409 U.S . 115 (1973); Bd. of 
Edllc. v. Barnette. 3 19 U.S . 624 (1943); Stromberg v. California. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) . 
17. By stipulation, flag uses not covered by this amendment would remain fully subject to First 
Amendment protection in circumstances where that protection would otherwise be deemed mandated 
by the Supreme Court, although flag uses covered by this amendment would be stripped of such 
First Amendment protection. 
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IS, There was express testimony on behalf of the Department of Justice that the amendment 
Il'Ullid authorize legislation reaching this kind of act. so the matter is not some lawyer 's contrived 
case, ISee Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Judiciary 
Committee. 101 Cong, 1st Sess , IS8- 89 (Statement of Wm, Barr, Office of Legal Counsel). July 
13. IS. 19.20. 1989,1 
19, The case ISpence I', Washington. 418 U,S. 405 (1974») is briefly noted at note 15 supra. 
The Supreme Court applied the First Amendment and reversed a criminal conviction on very similar 
facts. 
20. But ,urely some will regard this as an act of "physical" disfigurement- that the tape is 
temporary or removable will surely not be of any point. (In Spellce, Justice Rehnquist noted to 
sustain the criminal conviction . though the tape was removable without damage to the fabric of the 
nag,) 
21, IThis case is modeled on an actual case it closely resembles, see Radich 1'. New York. 401 
U.S 531 (1971). aJTg, 26 N. Y. 2d 114 (1970). Oil habeascorpus in U.S, ex reI. Radich I'. Criminal 
Cr. 459 F,2d 754 (2d Cir. 1972). cut. den. 409 U.S. 115 (1973)·1 
22. The case is but a slight variation of Street ~' . New York. 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (reversing a 
state criminal court flag burning conviction on First Amendment grounds). 
